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This paper examines the performance of the JTPA performance system, a widely emulated model
for inducing efficiency in government organizations. We present a model of how performance incentives
may distort bureaucratic decisions. We define cream skimming within the model. Two major empirical
findings are (a) that the short run measures used to monitor performance are weakly, and sometimes
perversely, related to long run impacts and (b) that the efficiency gains or losses from cream skimming
are small. We find evidence that centers respond to performance standards.
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I. Introduction  
Incentives based on performance standards have been advocated to promote productivity 
and to direct activity in public organizations. Little is known about how performance standards 
systems perform
1.  This paper presents evidence on this question using data from a social 
experiment on a major U.S. government training program with performance standard incentives. 
The performance standards system in this program, the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), is a 
prototype for other government programs. The 1993 Performance Standards Act (U.S. Congress, 
1993) required the use of performance systems similar to that of JTPA in many other 
government programs. In particular, JTPA's successor as the primary federal training program 
for the disadvantaged, the Workforce Investment Act (WIA), utilizes an expanded version of the 
JTPA performance system.  Performance systems like that in JTPA are in use around the world.   
The JTPA incentive system was unique in providing incentives at the local organization 
level but not to specific individuals within organizations.  Little is known about how 
performance standard systems at the level of local organizations work in practice. This paper 
presents new evidence on this issue and summarizes related research scattered throughout the 
published literature and in government reports. We take it as given that performance standards 
affect the behavior of the organization (see, for example, Courty and Marschke, 1996, 1997).  In 
that light, we address two basic questions.  First, do the behavioral responses further the goals of 
the program?  If not, what do they do instead?  Second, how do specific actors within 
bureaucracies respond to the incentives presented to them? 
The main focus of this paper is on the first question. We consider whether JTPA 
performance incentives promoted “desirable” outcomes. Unlike many government programs, the 
JTPA program had tangible outputs: the employment and earnings of its participants. There is Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 3 
widespread agreement that maximizing the gain (for example, the increase in the present value of 
discounted earnings relative to what participants would have experienced had they not 
participated) is a worthy goal. In addition, the JTPA program was created with clearly stated 
objectives, so that there is a well-defined set of targets against which to measure performance. 
As noted by Wilson (1989), both features of the JTPA program are unusual when compared to 
the many other government agencies that lack clearly stated objectives or adequate 
measurements of performance.  
Even though the goals of the program are clearly stated, they may be in conflict. The Job 
Training Partnership Act (Public Law 97- 300) mandated the provision of employment and 
training opportunities to “those who can benefit from, and are most in need of, such 
opportunities.” (Section 141 (c)). Since benefit and need are different things, the potential for 
conflict between efficiency and equity is written into the law authorizing the program.
2 Whether 
or not those who benefit most are also the most in need is an empirical question that we 
investigate in this paper.  
  The JTPA program was designed to improve the human capital of its participants. 
Evaluation of human capital projects inherently involves evaluation of earnings and employment 
trajectories over time, and comparing them to other human capital investments, including no 
investment at all. This involves two distinct problems: (a) construction of counterfactual states 
(what participants would have earned in their next best alternative) and (b) measuring outcomes 
and creating counterfactuals over the harvest period of the investment, which may be a lifetime. 
Both problems are difficult. Constructing counterfactual states is a controversial activity (see, for 
example, Heckman, 2001, and Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999). Tracking persons over 
time is a costly activity and does not produce short run feedback on the success of the program.  Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 4 
The JTPA performance standards system, and most related systems, attempt to circumvent these 
fundamental problems by using the outcomes of participants measured at the time they complete 
the program, or within a few months thereafter.  Such measures are necessarily short run in 
nature.  In addition, such systems do not attempt to construct even the short run counterfactual.  
  Use of these short term outcome measures creates the possibility that the performance 
standards misdirect activity by focusing training center attention on criteria that may be 
perversely related to long run net benefits, long run equity criteria, or both. This is especially 
likely in the context of a human capital program. One benefit of training is that it encourages 
further training and schooling.  Such additional investment depresses measured employment and 
earnings in the short run, but raises it in the long run.
3  In this case, the short run measurements 
on which performance standards are based will likely be perversely related to long run benefits. 
We present evidence on this question and summarize other evidence from the literature. We 
establish that fears of misalignment or perverse alignment of the incentives are justified.  
  Most discussions of performance standards (see, for example, Anderson et al., 1992, and 
Barnow, 1992) focus on “cream skimming”.  Sometimes this term is defined as selecting persons 
into the program who would have done well without it.  In the context of a system of 
performance standards, cream skimming is defined as selecting people who help attain short run 
goals, rather than selecting persons on the basis of their expected long run benefit from 
participation.  In the current literature, the definition of cream skimming is vague and the 
methods used to measure it are not convincing. Implicit in the current literature is the assumption 
that program and no-program outcomes are basically the same, except for a positive treatment 
effect common to all persons.  One contribution of this paper is to precisely define the concept of 
cream skimming in the modern language of counterfactuals and to relate it to an economic model Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 5 
of performance standards.  Cream skimming may or may not be a serious problem. If persons 
who would have done well without the program have the largest gains from it, then cream 
skimming may promote efficiency.  We present evidence on this question below.  
  The paper proceeds as follows. Section II outlines the basic evaluation problem and how 
performance standards attempt to solve it. We present a model of training center performance 
under performance standards and define cream skimming in the context of our model.  Section 
III describes the JTPA program and its performance standards system.  We show that features of 
the JTPA system are in widespread use, so our analysis of JTPA has some generality.  Section IV 
describes our data.  Section V presents evidence on the efficiency effects of cream skimming.  
Section VI presents evidence on the effects of performance standards on the behavior of training 
centers and their staff.  Section VII presents evidence on how well the short run target outcomes 
used in performance standards predict long run impacts.  Section VIII concludes. 
 
II. Policy Counterfactuals, Performance Standards, and Cream Skimming  
A. A Model of Training Center Choices  
Successful human capital investment programs produce a time series of returns after the 
intervention. For simplicity we analyze a program that takes one period to train persons selected 
from the eligible population.  Training centers face a new cohort of eligible applicants each 
period. All persons in each prospective training cohort have one chance to train.  They are then 
replaced by the next period’s cohort.  The environment is assumed to be stationary so that the 
same decision rules are followed each period given the same state variables (that is, the 
environment facing the center).  There is a benchmark outcome that corresponds to no program 
or the next best program. Persons participate or not in period “0” of their lifecycle. Thus, we Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 6 
normalize lifecycle periods relative to the benchmark period when the training participation 
decision is made.
4 Participants experience a series of outcomes, 
1,0 , , a Ya A = K  where A is the 
final period of the person's life.  In the absence of the program, persons experience outcomes 
0,0 , , a Ya A = K . The per-period treatment effect is 
10
aa a YY −= ∆ . The treatment effect can be 
negative in the short run if the initial investment leads to additional investment.
5  To make our 
analysis fit into a standard cost-benefit framework, let Y denote earnings.  Given direct cost, c, 
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for each person. We abstract from general equilibrium effects of the scale of the program.
6  We 
assume that () , a c ∆  varies among individuals but assume a common r.
7  
In our model, we assume that training centers can apply different amounts of “input”, e, 
to any individual client.  In the JTPA context, the input variable represents staff time and the 
direct costs of the services provided.  The inputs affect the outcomes experienced by participants.  
In particular, input e yields  
(2)  ()
10 , aa Yf Y e = , 
at cost c(e), where c(0) = 0.  Total cost c = c(e) + k , where k is a fixed cost. 
Given these assumptions, training centers have several degrees of freedom. First, for a 
fixed set of inputs, a training center can choose to serve applicants with different () , a c ∆  
combinations.  Second, holding the set of persons served fixed, the training center can vary the 
inputs it provides to each participant.  This changes the set of potential outcomes for  
participants.  This framework recognizes that the inputs provided by training centers will Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 7 
augment or reduce the potential outcome that participants would have experienced in the absence 
of participation.  Third, a training center can choose how many participants to serve by trading 
off between the fixed per participant costs k and the variable per participant input costs c(e).  
If the goal of the training center is to maximize the ex post present value of the earnings 
impacts realized by its trainees, it solves a constrained optimization problem that we now 
describe.  Notice that if there were no budget constraints, the center would find the e that 
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Training centers operate under a budget constraint B.  Thus they face a tradeoff between 
serving more clients and increasing inputs per client.  Let {1,…,I} be the index set of eligible 
applicants.  Person i has an associated cost (variable, ci(e), and fixed, ki.).  We assume that 
technology (2) is common across persons although this assumption can easily be relaxed.  
Associated with each potential set of trainees,  { } 1,..., S I ⊂  is a number of trainees N(S).  For each 
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subject to (2) and 




i i i k e c B . 
For LaGrange multiplier λ  attached to (5),  this produces the first order condition for each 




















 ∂∂ + 
∑  
This is the standard efficiency condition for ei (marginal benefit equals marginal cost).  In the 
absence of a budget constraint, λ  = 1 at an interior optimum.  In general, λ  ≥  1, reflecting the 
scarcity of the resources available to the center, and the center invests less in each person than 
would be the case if resources were not constrained.
8 
  Write the maximized present value that is the solution to this problem as 
() B S, ψ , which reflects the fact that present value obtained depends on the coalition S of trainees 
selected and the available budget.  The center’s problem is to pick the optimal S, S*, such that  
() ()
*,a r g m a x, .
S
SB S B ψψ =
9 
Implementing this optimal ex post solution requires substantial amounts of information unlikely 
to be available to the center at date “0” when applicants are admitted. Future ()
10 , aa YY  are 
unlikely to be available (although past information on 
0
a Y  may be available), and other sources of 
information useful for predicting ()
10 , , 1,..., aa YY a A =  may be available. All of the available 
studies suggest that forecasting future ∆ a is a difficult problem.
10   
Let  i J  be the information set about individual i. Then, ex ante, the criterion for 



















  +  
∑∑ , 
subject to (2), (5) and the individual-specific information sets { } i iS J
∈ . Then for each S, { } i iS J
∈ , B Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 9 
and r, we may write the present value solution as () ,, SBJ ψ , where  1I { ,..., } J JJ = .  The training 
center seeks to maximize this criterion with respect to S , so that 
() ()
*, , argmax , ,
S
SB J S B J ψψ = . 
  The center adjusts at three margins: which applicants become trainees, the amount of 
inputs devoted to each trainee and the number of trainees.  The exact tradeoffs depend on the 
specification of the technology for producing skill and the cost.  If the marginal cost of 
producing skills, c(e), is rapidly increasing, or returns are rapidly decreasing, the center has a 
stronger incentive to increase the number of trainees than to increase inputs per trainee.  In a 
stationary environment, the training center makes the same decision in every period. We expand 
on this analysis in Heckman (2003).
11 
 
B. Adding Performance Standards to the Model  
If the center seeks to maximize the present value of the earnings gains of its trainees 
given the budget B, ex ante optimality is obtainable.  In this setting, there is no role for 
performance standards even if the training center has imperfect information about potential 
outcomes. A role for performance standards emerges if the training center has a criterion 
different from  () ,, , SBJ ψ  or some monotonic function of it.  Suppose that the center has 
preferences  () () () () S Q S N S U , , ψ  where  () S ψ  is the present value of gains for trainee cohort S, 
N(S) is the number of participants served (≤  I) in cohort S (one year's trainees in JTPA, as 
performance is evaluated on an annual basis), and Q(S) is the “quality” of the persons served. For 
notational simplicity we suppress the and  BJ arguments in  () ,, , SBJ ψ except where needed. Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 10 
By Q(S) we mean characteristics of the potential trainees other than their impacts.  For 
example, county and city governments often administer their local training centers, with the 
result that staff may face pressure to serve groups targeted by the local politicians (see, for 
example, Smith, 1992). At the same time, concerns about the social welfare of the least well off 
among the applicant population may lead local bureaucrats to serve persons who would be 
excluded by criterion (7). In the presence of these preferences for goals other than impact 
maximation (that is, other than allocation based purely on efficiency concerns), or in the 
presence of organizational lethargy (the on-the-job leisure enjoyed by the staff may, for example, 
decrease in e), performance standards may redirect activity toward choosing the persons and 
treatments that satisfy () . S ψ  
Courty and Marschke (2003) document that a variety of performance systems currently 
guide government programs.  Most have the following character. The training center receives a 
reward R if certain short run criteria are satisfied. An idealized version focuses on the short term 
outcomes of trainees, which we operationalize as the average outcome in time period “1” for the 










= ∑ Y  
where the subscript on 
1
1 Y  denotes time period “1”, while the first subscript on  1,i Y  denotes age 
“1”, measured relative to the age of training.  The “0” subscript on S indicates the current cohort 
of trainees: 
(8)  () 0 ,
1
1 S τ ≥ Y  
a threshold value, the training center gets R. Otherwise it does not.  Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 11 
Several factors motivate the use of short-term outcome measures. First, in order for a 
performance standards system to be effective, it must provide quick feedback to program 
managers. Feedback that arrives years after the corresponding actions by program staff is of little 
use for short-term decisions, but it may have great scientific value for learning about the 
parameters of the system and devising an effective performance standards system in the long run. 
Second, evaluations (whether experimental or non-experimental) that seek to estimate the 
counterfactual outcomes of participants, which are required to produce impact estimates, take a 
long time, typically on the order of years. This is true even if the impacts they produce are short-
run impacts because of the time associated with collecting comparison group data, cleaning the 
data and performing econometric analyses.  Third, performance measures based on impacts are 
likely to be controversial, either because of uncertainty about the econometric method utilized, in 
the case of non-experimental methods, or politically, in the case of random assignment.  Finally, 
performance standards measures based on outcome levels generally cost much less to produce 
than measures based on impacts, . a ∆  This is important, because an expensive performance 
management system, even if it accomplishes something, may not accomplish enough to justify 
the expense.  Estimating impacts, either experimentally or non-experimentally, is technically 
demanding and therefore difficult to automate.  As a result, it would likely require the ongoing 
intervention of expensive analysts. In contrast, as already noted, an outcome-based system can 
typically rely on straightforward calculations based on administrative data.  Both start-up and 
operating costs are relatively low for outcomes based systems.  
Reward R is used to augment the center budget for the next cohort of trainees but cannot 
be used as direct bonuses to center bureaucrats – or their employees. This incentive directs Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 12 
attention toward the short run goal of attaining  () 0 ,
1
1 S Y  which may, or may not, serve to 
maximize the present value of output  () ,, SBJ ψ  for the current batch of JTPA trainees. 
  These incentives create a new intertemporal dynamic that is absent without performance 
standards.  Decisions by the center today affect the quality and quantity of participants today and 
the resources available to the center to train tomorrow’s cohort.  The center's problem changes in 
the presence of the incentive constraint provided by the performance standards system.  () 0
1
1 S Y  
is a random variable as of date “0”.  Thus, the budget for the next cohort, B % , is stochastic, and is 





















The reward can only be spent on the next cohort of trainees. 
 
C. A Two-Cohort Model with Performance Standards 
  The analysis of a model for a training center that serves only two cohorts is particularly 
simple, and provides a useful point of departure for the more complicated model we analyze 
below.  Assume that the budget for the first cohort is fixed at B.  The choice of S0, the initial 
training group, affects  () 0,, SB J ψ  as before (as well as N(S0) and Q(S0)).  But it also affects the 
resources available to train the next cohort in the second period. 
  In the second period, the agency has budget B + R if 
1
10 () S τ ≥ Y , so that it meets its 
performance standards.  It has budget B otherwise.  Thus, in this simplified two-cohort model, 
the problem of the center is to pick  0 S  so as to maximize Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 13 
(9) 
( ) ()() ()
()( ) ( ) ( ) ()
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 is a discount rate. 
1
1 S  is the cohort selected in the second period if 
1
10 () S τ ≥ Y , so 
that the budget equals BR + .  
0
1 S  is the cohort selected in the second period if 
1
10 () S τ < Y , so 
that the budget equals B.  Solving the two-cohort problem involves a two-stage maximization.  
For the second period cohort, there are two possible states, corresponding to whether the first 
cohort succeeds or fails relative to the performance standards.  The center picks a group of 
trainees for each possible budget.  Given these optimal values, it picks S0 to maximize criterion 
(9)—given the values of 
0
1 S  and 
1
1 S  selected in the first stage maximization. 
 Heuristically,  if  0 S were a continuous variable, and (9) were differentiable in  0 S , the first 
order condition would be 
() ( ) ( ) ()
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The first term reflects the value of  0 S  in raising the current utility of the training center.  
The second term captures the motivating effect of performance standards, which equals the 
marginal effect of S0 on the probability of winning the award times the increase in center utility 
from winning the award.
12  In the two-cohort model, there is no third cohort whose budget gets Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 14 
determined by the second cohort, so this incentive effect disappears when the center makes 
decisions regarding the second cohort. 
  In this simple model, performance standards may distort performance.  Even if the 
agency would maximize present value in their absence, the performance incentives create the 
possibility of distortion.  If R is sufficiently large and c and  ρ  sufficiently small, and if 
1
10 () YSis 
weakly or perversely correlated with present value in the absence of the performance standards, 
the agency may distort its choices in serving the first cohort in order to get a reward that it can 
then use to serve the second cohort.  If the reward is sufficiently large, it can raise the 
(discounted) present value in the second period enough to more than offset the loss in present 
value in the first period.  Of course, the actual solution is more complicated because the criterion 
is not differentiable in S0.  But this heuristic is a useful guide to the more general solution, which 
is presented in Heckman (2003). 
 
D. A Model For A Stationary Environment With Performance Standards 
  This simple two-cohort model abstracts from an important feature of the JTPA system, 
which we now develop.  In reality, training centers serve multiple cohorts of trainees over many 
time periods.  To take an opposite extreme to the one just considered, suppose, for analytical 
simplicity, that training centers last forever, and that the environment they face is stationary.   
  Training centers at any point of chronological time can be in one of two states: (a) in 
receipt of a bonus R, so that they have budget B+R to spend on the current cohort or (b) without 
the bonus, so that they have budget B.  They influence these budgetary outcomes by their choice 
of S in the previous chronological time period.  What they choose depends on the resources 
available to the center in that period.  Since the environment is stationary, and there are only two Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 15 
states, the model is a Markovian decision problem.  This means that the decision variable S does 
not have to be time subscripted, just state subscripted, depending on whether or not in any given 
period the budget is B or BR + . 
 Define  0 V  as the value function of a center without a reward in the current period and 
1 V as the value function for a center with a reward in the current period.  Then,  
 
11
01 1 1 0
11
max ( ( , , ), ( ), ( )) Pr( ( ) ) Pr( ( ) )
11 S
VU S B J N S Q S S V S V ψ ττ
ρρ
=+ ≥ + <
++
YY , 
where we make the budget in each state explicit by entering it as a conditioning argument in the 




max ( ( , , ), ( ), ( )) Pr( ( ) ) Pr( ( ) )
11 S





We assume that 10 VV > , because more resources further center objectives.  The optimal choice of 
S  depends on the rewards, the preferences, and the constraints facing centers.  Here we present 
an intuitive analysis of the effects of incentives.  We develop this model formally in Heckman 
(2003), but a number of features of it are intuitively obvious and we record them here without 
proof. 
(1) Let 
01 P be the transition probability of going from no reward to a reward and let 
11 P be the transition probability of having a reward in two consecutive periods.  Since having 
more resources makes it easier to attain all center objectives, including meeting performance 
standards next period, 
11 01 P P > .  Performance standards impart a value to incumbency. 
(2) The analysis of the two-period model carries over in part in this more general setting.  
With sufficiently large R, sufficiently small  ρ , and sufficiently misdirected performance 
incentives (incentives not aligned with present value maximization), centers that care only about Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 16 
maximizing the present value of the earnings gains of participants may choose to divert resources 
away from that goal in low budget (non-reward) periods.  They will do so in order to get the 
budgetary reward in the following period, which can then be spent to generate a larger total 
discounted stream of earnings gains than would period-by-period earnings gain maximization.  
The same incentives are not operative in high budget periods.  Thus, in the case where center 
preferences are the same as social preferences, if discount rates are sufficiently low, misaligned 
performance standards may distort activity, but only in the low budget state. 
  (3) For the conditions on center preferences analyzed in point (2), and the same 
misalignment of performance incentives, if the probability of attaining the reward threshold is 
sufficiently low, but the reward R  is sufficiently high, the introduction of performance standards 
can lower the aggregate output of all centers.  Unsuccessful centers divert their activities away 
from productive uses and toward meeting the targets.  Successful centers produce more human 
capital because they have more resources.  If the gains for the successful centers are sufficiently 
small and the successful centers are a small fraction of all centers, aggregate output can decrease.  
In general, the question of whether or not incentives distort or enhance aggregate productivity of 
training centers is an empirical question on which we provide some information in this paper. 
 
E. Cream Skimming 
The most common criticism of the JTPA performance standards system, and other similar 
systems, is that they encourage cream skimming. That is, by rewarding training centers based on 
the mean outcomes of their participants, rather than the mean impacts of the services they 
provide, the system encourages them to serve persons who will have good labor market 
outcomes (as measured by the system) whether or not the program has any benefit for them, or Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 17 
for whom there are substantial short run benefits.  The performance measures create an incentive 
to serve persons with a high value of 
1
1,i Y , regardless of whether that high value results from a 
high value of 
0
1,i Y  or a high value of ∆ 1,i. The existing literature is vague about whether cream 




, 1 or    i i Y Y .  The logic of performance standards in terms 
of program outcomes suggests a definition in terms of 
1
, 1 i Y .
13  
As noted in Heckman (1992), and Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), conventional 
models of program evaluation assume that 
10
,,  and  ai ai YY  differ by a constant:  
10
,, ,  for all  , ai ai ai a YY i ∆= − = ∆  
that is, that everyone has the same impact of treatment.
14 This is the so-called “common effect” 
model. In this case, a high 
1
, 1 i Y  goes hand in glove with a high 
0
, 1 i Y  and picking persons with a 
high 
0
, 1 i Y  helps toward satisfying (8). Assuming equal costs across all trainees, cream skimming 
(or “bottom scraping” by focusing on the “hard to serve”) is innocuous, because all participants 
have the same impact from the program.  
Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997) show that when the ranks of 
1
, 1 i Y  and 
0
, 1 i Y  in their 
respective distributions are the same, one can relax the assumption that ∆ a is the same for 
everyone, but preserve many of the features of the common effect model without assuming a 




, 1   i i Y Y  is increasing in 
0
1,i Y , the center has an incentive 
to cream skim on 
0
, 1 i Y .  Cream skimming on the untreated outcome furthers the maximization of 






, 1 - i i i Y Y Y is increasing in 
0
, 1 i Y .  Cream skimming on Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 18 
0
1,i Y has the same effects as cream skimming on 
1
1,i Y  because the two are monotonically related if 
the densities of 
0
1,i Y  and 
1
1,i Y  are continuous.  
Finally, many of the analyses in Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997) suggest that most 
of the variance in 
1
1,i Y  is actually variance in 
0
1,i Y  or, put differently, the variance of  1,i ∆  is small 
relative to that of 
0
1,i Y .  In this case, cream skimming based on 
0
1,i Y  will again have essentially the 
same effects on the efficiency or equity of the program's choices as cream skimming based on 
1




A. The JTPA Program  
   The Job Training Partnership Act program began in 1982. It envisioned a partnership 
between the private, public and non-profit sectors in providing employment and training services 
to the disadvantaged. Until recently, when it was replaced by the Workforce Investment Act, 
JTPA was the largest federal employment and training program.  The program operated through 
local training centers, which usually had a local monopoly on providing JTPA services (though 
not on government-subsidized employment and training services in general). JTPA was a 
voluntary program (for both participants and training centers) that served persons receiving 
means tested federal transfers or with a low family income in the six months preceding program 
entry. Commonly provided services included classroom training in occupational skills, 
subsidized on-the-job training at private firms and job search assistance. Among youth, basic 
education (often leading to taking the GED exam) and work experience were also sometimes Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 19 
provided.
15 Most services were contracted out to private providers, non-profit agencies or other 
government agencies (such as community colleges).  
 
B. The JTPA Performance Standards System 
The federal government, the states, and the local JTPA training centers all played distinct 
roles in the JTPA system. The federal government defined core performance standard outcome 
measures. These measures evolved somewhat over time, but always included employment rates, 
either at termination from JTPA or 13 weeks after, and average wage rates among participants 
who found employment, computed for both all participants and participants on welfare. The 
simple model in Section II, which defines performance in terms of earnings levels, captures only 
one of the many measures actually used, but can easily be modified for other measures, or for the 
weighted average of measures actually used in the JTPA system (see Heckman, 2003).  Each 
program year, the federal government defined target levels, or standards, for each core outcome 
measure, and provided a regression model that allowed states to adjust the targets for differences 
in economic conditions and participant characteristics among centers.  
The individual states could adopt the federally defined standards or modify and augment 
them within broad limits. Many states added additional measures that provided incentives to 
serve particular groups within the JTPA-eligible population. States also had substantial discretion 
over the “award function,” the rule that determined centers' budgetary payoffs as a function of 
their performance relative to the standards and, in some cases, relative to each other. As 
documented in Courty and Marschke (2003), these functions varied widely among states on 
many dimensions. All of the state systems shared the feature that centers were never worse off 
for increasing average employment or wages among participants. For this reason, and because Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 20 
the employment and wage rate measures typically received the greatest weight in the state award 
functions, we concentrate our analysis on these measures. 
The individual centers kept track of the participants' labor market outcomes, subject to 
state and federal reporting rules. At the end of each program year, states calculated the 
performance measures for each center and determined the reward it would receive. Depending on 
the state award function and its performance, a center could receive nothing (or even a sanction 
if it was far below the threshold) or, in the event of success, as much as a 20 to 30 percent 
increase in its regular budget. Centers valued these award funds because they could be used more 
flexibly than regular budget allocations.  
 
C. The WIA Performance Standards System 
The performance standards systems for many other programs, including employment and 
training programs in Canada and Germany, resemble those in the JTPA system in their reliance 
on short term outcome levels as a proxy for long term impacts.  Thus our analysis has generality 
well beyond the JTPA program.  The performance standards system for the WIA program, the 
successor to JTPA, is similar in both its federalism and in the types of performance measures it 
employs. The WIA system is described in detail in U.S. Department of Labor (2000a,b) and 
criticized in U.S. General Accounting Office (2002).  WIA provides essentially the same services 
as JTPA to a somewhat broader population.  O'Shea and King (2001) describe the program in 
detail.  Its performance standard measures include close analogs to the JTPA measures we study 
here, such as entry into unsubsidized employment and retention in unsubsidized employment six 
months after entry into employment (where “retention” need not mean actually keeping the same 
job).
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IV. The National JTPA Study Data 
We use data gathered as part of the National JTPA Study, an experimental evaluation of 
the JTPA program.
17  The experiment was conducted at 16 of the more than 600 JTPA training 
centers.  At these centers, persons who applied to and were accepted into the program were 
randomly assigned to either a treatment group allowed access to JTPA services or to a control 
group denied access to JTPA services for the next 18 months. Background information including 
demographic variables, educational attainment, work histories, indicators of previous training 
and of participation in government transfer programs, and family income and composition were 
collected at the time of random assignment. Survey information on employment and earnings 
was collected around 18 months after random assignment and again for a sub-sample of the 
experimental group around 30 months after random assignment.  
 
V. The Efficiency Effects of Cream Skimming 
In this section, we present two pieces of evidence on the efficiency effects of cream 
skimming in JTPA. We then review the literature on whether or not cream skimming actually 
occurs in practice.  
 




a Y .  
As noted in Heckman (1992) and Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), experimental 
data alone do not identify both components of ()
01 , aa YY or their joint distribution.  They only 
identify the marginal distributions of 
0
a Y and 
1
a Y .  We know either 
0
a Y (for the controls) or 
1
a Y (for Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 22 
the treatments) but not both for either group.  Thus, without further assumptions, it is not 
possible to form 
10
aaa YY ∆= − for anyone or to relate it to either 
0
a Y or 
1
a Y . 
Following Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), if the ranks of 
0
a Y and 
1
a Y  for any 
person are the same in their respective distributions, it is possible to associate a 
0
a Y with each 
1
a Y , 
and the association is unique if both distributions are continuous.  We use this assumption to 
construct  a ∆ as a function of 
0
a Y .  Given continuity of the two marginal distributions and the 
perfect ranking assumption, 
0 () aa Y ∆ can be expressed as a function of 
0
a Y (or its percentile 
equivalent 
1
a Y ).  Under this assumption cream skimming on 
0
a Y is equivalent to cream skimming 
on 
1
a Y .  
The perfect ranking assumption is implied by the common effect assumption  , ai a ∆= ∆  
for all i but does not imply it. It generalizes the common effect assumption by allowing the 
impact  a ∆ to vary as a function of 
0
a Y . We operationalize this idea by taking percentile 
differences across the treated and untreated outcome distributions.
18  Let 
0,j
a Y  denote the jth 
percentile of the 
0
a Y  distribution, with 
1, j
a Y  the corresponding percentile in the 
1
a Y  distribution. 
Thus, we estimate  ()
0, 1, 0, jj j
aa a a YY Y ∆= − .   
Figures 1A and 1B present estimates of  ()
0,j
aa Y ∆ constructed using this method for adult 
females and males, respectively.  Earnings in the 18 months after random assignment constitute 
the outcome. Consider first the estimates for adult women in Figure 1A, for whom the sample 
size is the largest. At the low end, the impact is zero through the 20th percentile. This region 
corresponds to persons with zero earnings in the 18 months after random assignment in both the 
treated and untreated states. The treatment effect is flat and positive over the interval from the Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 23 
20th to the 90th percentile, after which there is a discernible increase in the estimated impact in 
the final decile. Figure 1A suggests that with equal costs per participant, the net gains from 
participation are modest and roughly constant over a broad range of untreated outcomes, and that 
cream skimming past the 20th percentile probably contributes little to efficiency. However, a 
policy of targeting services at the bottom two deciles would likely entail considerable efficiency 
costs. Figure 1B for adult men tells a similar tale. The curve is flat over the range from the 10th 
to the 50th percentile, after which it dips and then begins to rise.  
 
B. Impact Estimates and Participant Characteristics   
Another way to assess the potential for efficiency losses from cream skimming is to 
establish whether or not the predictors of 
1
a Y  are correlated with measured impacts.  Program 
officials are likely to use characteristics() X to forecast the short run target outcome.  The 
relationship between the predictors and  a ∆  is of interest in its own right.  We find few precise 
relationships between the predictors and the impacts and conclude that there are unlikely to be 
sizeable efficiency losses from cream skimming. 
Tables 1A and 1B summarize subgroup estimates of the impact of JTPA on the earnings 
and employment of adult females and adult males in the JTPA experiment, respectively.
19  The 
first column in each table lists the values of each subgroup variable.  Columns two through five 
present impact estimates on 18- month and 30-month earnings and 18-month and 30-month 
employment, respectively.  The tables also present p-values from tests of the null of equal 
impacts among subgroups for each X. 
We estimated subgroup impacts conditional on labor force status (employed, unemployed 
and out of the labor force) and highest grade completed, both measured at random assignment. Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 24 
We also estimated impacts conditional on receipt of Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC)
20 and on the month of last employment (if any). All of these variables predict the level 
of the 18-month and 30-month outcomes for participants.    
For adult females, we reject the null of equal impacts among subgroups in four of the 
sixteen possible cases. The rejections (at the five percent level) occur for employment over 18 
months and earnings over 30 months conditional on AFDC receipt, and over 30 months for both 
earnings and employment conditional on month of last employment, with larger impacts in each 
case for women receiving AFDC.  However, even when we do not reject the null of equal 
impacts, the point estimates suggest very different impacts, and hence the possibility of 
substantial efficiency losses from cream skimming which cannot be detected in our samples. The 
point estimates for the other two sets of estimates, for which the null of equality is not rejected, 
suggest larger impacts for AFDC recipients. As AFDC receipt is negatively related to 
1
a Y , this 
finding suggests that cream skimming may be (slightly) inefficient for adult women.  The 
interpretation of the subgroup estimates for adult females conditional on month of last 
employment before random assignment is less clear, as the pattern of coefficient estimates is 
non-monotonic. This finding, combined with the general lack of statistically significant subgroup 
differences in impact estimates and the sometimes substantial changes in the estimated 
coefficients from 18 to 30 months, suggest, at most, weak evidence of modest inefficiency 
arising from cream skimming for adult females.  
For adult males, statistically significant differences in impacts among subgroups defined 
by X emerge only once, for impacts on 18-month earnings conditional on labor force status. In 
this case, the largest impacts appear for men employed at the time of random assignment. 
Employment at random assignment is positively correlated with 
1
a Y . As for the adult women, the Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 25 
insignificant coefficients vary substantially among subgroups, and reveal patterns that are 
difficult to interpret, such as non-monotonicity as a function of months since last employment or 
years of schooling, as well as substantial changes from 18 to 30 months. Combined with the 
general lack of statistically significant subgroup impacts, the pattern of estimates presents weak 
evidence of at most a modest efficiency gain to cream skimming for adult males.  For both men 
and women, of course, the costs of service provision may vary among subgroups as well, so that 
the net impacts may differ in either direction from the gross impacts reported here.  
Other results in the literature that make use of the experimental data from the NJS echo 
the findings in Table 1. Bloom et al. (1993, Exhibits 4.15 and 5.14) present subgroup impact 
estimates on earnings in the 18 months after random assignment, while Orr et al. (1996, Exhibits 
5.8 and 5.9) present similar estimates for 30-month earnings, using a somewhat different 
earnings measure than we use here.
21  Both consider a different set of subgroups than we do. 
Only a couple of significant subgroup impacts appear at 18 months. At 30 months, the only 
significant subgroup differences found by Orr et al. (1996) among adults are for adult men, 
where men with a spouse present have higher impacts.
22  Overall, the absence of many 
statistically significant subgroup differences, combined with the pattern of point estimates, 
makes the findings in Bloom et al. (1993) and Orr et al. (1996) consistent with our own findings.  




VI. The Effects of Performance Incentives on Behavior 
A.  Cream-Skimming in JTPA? Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 26 
In this section, we review the evidence on the question of whether or not cream skimming 
occurs in response to the incentives presented by the JTPA performance standards system. In 
order to do so, we first introduce some additional notation that will allow us to define precisely 
how we can go about identifying cream skimming empirically. We define indicators for the 
following stages of the JTPA participation process: E for eligibility for JTPA, W for awareness 
of the JTPA program, A for application to JTPA, C for acceptance into the JTPA program and T 
for formal enrollment in the JTPA program. These stages are largely self-explanatory except for 
acceptance, which means that a spot in the program has been offered.  Figure 2 summarizes the 
stages in the JTPA participation process.   
In Section II we defined cream skimming as selection of persons into the program based 
on 
1
1 Y , and noted that empirically this is essentially the same as selection on 
0
1 Y .  In examining 
cream skimming empirically, two issues arise.  The first is that we do not observe 
1
1 Y  for non-
participants, and so we cannot directly examine the cream skimming question by comparing 
values of 
1
1 Y  for participants and non-participants or for accepted and rejected applicants.  The 
literature typically addresses this issue by looking at observable characteristics X that predict 
1
1 Y , 
either directly or in the form of a predicted value  () X Y
1
1 ˆ .  Addressing the cream skimming issue 
in this way implicitly assumes the validity of matching on  X as an estimator.  If the assumptions 
of matching are satisfied for  X , we can use  ()
1
1 YX for participants to validly approximate 
()
1
1 YX  for nonparticipants.  
The second issue concerns what population of non-participants against which to compare 
the participants.  The literature adopts two approaches to this issue. The first compares 
participants with the eligible population as a whole.  This approach implicitly assumes that in the Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 27 
absence of cream skimming, eligibles would participate at random, or at least not in a way that 
looks like cream skimming.  As a result, it potentially conflates self-selection by participants 
with the exercise of administrative discretion in choosing among applicants.   
As discussed in Devine and Heckman (1996), the JTPA program casts a fairly wide net in 
terms of eligibility. Its eligible population includes persons with stable, low-wage employment. 
As shown in Heckman and Smith (1999), such persons have very low participation probabilities. 
They also have relatively high earnings within the eligible population. It is unlikely that cream 
skimming is the reason why such persons fail to participate in JTPA, especially since this group 
shows a low participation rate for other training programs without performance standards 
(Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999). The second approach attempts to avoid this problem by 
comparing participants only to applicants, on the argument that program bureaucrats have 
substantially more control over who participates among applicants than over who participates 
among eligibles.  A potential problem with this approach is that even among applicants, there 
may be self-selection out of the program into work.  Further, any control that staff have over who 
applies, through their marketing efforts and choice of contract providers such as non-profit 
community agencies, is missed.  
Anderson et al. (1992) use data on adult JTPA enrollees in Tennessee in 1987, combined 
with data on persons eligible for JTPA identified in the March 1986-1988 Current Population 
Surveys, to compare f(X | E = 0) with f(X | E=0, W = 0, A = 0, C = 0, T=0).  Relative to all 
eligibles, they find that participants are significantly more likely to be female, high school 
dropouts and AFDC recipients. Within the black and AFDC recipient subgroups, JTPA 
participants have much lower probabilities of being high school dropouts than eligible non-
participants. Using the same data, Anderson, et al. (1993) estimate a bivariate probit model of Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 28 
enrollment and of placement conditional on enrollment. In this multivariate framework, less 
educated eligibles (particularly high school dropouts) are under-represented in the program, but 
blacks and AFDC participants are not. Their model predicts that if eligible persons participated 
at random, the placement rate would fall 9.1 percentage points, from 70.7 percent to 61.6 
percent, suggesting modest evidence of cream-skimming when measured relative to all eligibles.  
Heckman and Smith (1995) use data from the four training centers in the JTPA 
experimental study at which special data on program eligibles were collected, combined with 
data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), to decompose the process of 
JTPA participation into four stages: eligibility, awareness, application and acceptance (combined 
into a single stage due to data limitations), and participation. Several findings emerge from their 
study. First, the differential participation of certain groups among the eligible population has 
multiple causes. For example, among the least educated (those with fewer than 10 years of 
schooling), lack of awareness of JTPA plays a critical role in deterring participation. Awareness 
depends only very indirectly on the efforts of JTPA staff. At the same time, adults with fewer 
than 10 years of schooling are also less likely to reach the application and acceptance stage 
conditional on awareness and are less likely to enroll conditional on applying and being 
accepted. This evidence suggests that cream skimming may play a role in their low participation 
rate. Second, Heckman and Smith (1995) provide evidence of cream skimming at the enrollment 
stage, where program staff members have the most influence. Blacks, persons with less than a 
high school education, persons from poorer families and those without recent employment 
experience are less likely to be enrolled than others, conditional on application and acceptance.
24  
The Heckman and Smith (1995) study demonstrates the importance of considering both self-Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 29 
selection and cream skimming at each stage of the participation process.  They find substantial 
evidence of cream skimming for some subgroups of the overall population. 
In a study of an individual center, Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996) use the JTPA 
experimental data from Corpus Christi, Texas.  They examine how predicted short-term earnings 
levels and predicted long-term earnings impacts affect the probability that an applicant gets 
accepted into the program (where acceptance is defined as reaching the point of random 
assignment) by estimating Pr(T=1| E=1, W=1, A=1, E(
1
1 Y  | X), E (PV|X)).  They estimate both 
E(
1
1 Y  | X), defined as expected earnings in the 18 months after random assignment for 
participants, and E(PV|X), defined as the expected discounted lifetime earnings gain from 
participating, either gross or net of costs, using the experimental data. The transition from 
application to acceptance should depend in large part on caseworker choices and thus provides 
the cleanest measure of cream skimming among the existing studies. They find strong evidence 
that caseworkers at Corpus Christi select negatively on E(
1
1 Y  | X).  That is, they find that 
caseworkers indulge their preferences for helping the most disadvantaged applicants rather than 
responding to the incentives provided by the performance standards system. At the same time, 
they find only weak evidence of positive selection on expected gains, E(PV|X). While the authors 
caution against over-generalizing from a study of only one of JTPA's more than 600 
heterogeneous training centers, this study demonstrates the empirical importance of negative 
cream skimming by caseworkers who indulge their preferences for helping the needy.    
 
B. Other Effects on Bureaucratic Behavior  
Heinrich's (1995, 1999, 2003) analyses of the Cook County JTPA center provide 
additional insights into how performance standards affect bureaucratic behavior.  At this site, Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 30 
which had a strong technocratic focus relative to other JTPA training centers, performance 
incentives were passed onto service providers through performance-based contracts.  Both 
caseworkers and program managers were keenly aware of contractually defined performance 
expectations, and placed a strong emphasis on achieving high placement rates at low cost 
(Heinrich, 1995, 2003).  Heinrich's (1999) analysis of the center's decisions in awarding 
contracts to service providers finds that the most important factor is a service provider's past 
performance relative to cost-per-placement standards in their earlier contracts. In addition, 
training center administrators set much higher performance requirements in the contracts they 
concluded with vendors than they themselves faced under the state performance standards 
system.  In essence, they insured themselves against the possibility that some providers would 
fail to meet their contractual standards.  
 
VII. How Well Do the Short Run Performance Measures Predict Long Run Impacts? 
This section presents evidence from our analysis of the JTPA experimental data and from 
the literature on the link between short-run outcome measures like those in the JTPA 
performance standards system (versions of 
1
1 Y ) and the longer-term impact of the program on 
participants' earnings and employment.  A central question is whether the short run performance 
measures based on outcomes predict long run impacts. 
 
A. Methods  
As discussed in Heckman (1992) and Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), without 
additional assumptions, experimental data cannot be used to generate individual-level impact 
estimates. Instead, we estimate subgroup mean impacts using covariates measured at the time of Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 31 
random assignment. For adult males and females in the NJS data, we form 43 subgroups based 
on the following characteristics measured at the time of random assignment: race, age, education, 
marital status, employment status, receipt of AFDC, receipt of food stamps, and training center. 
Individuals with complete data belong to eight subgroups, while those with incomplete data are 
included in as many subgroups as their data allow. Using self-reported earnings data, we 
construct total earnings over 18 and over 30 months after random assignment for each sample 
member with sufficient data. We also compute the fraction of months employed (where being 
employed in a month is defined as having positive earnings in that month) in each period as our 
employment outcome. Using a regression framework, we construct mean-difference 
experimental impact estimates for each subgroup and adjust these estimates to reflect the fact 
that a substantial fraction of persons (41 percent of adult males and 37 percent of adult females) 
in the treatment group dropped out and did not participate in JTPA.
25,26 
The JTPA performance measures we analyze are hourly wage and employment at 
termination from the program and weekly earnings and employment 13 weeks after termination. 
In practice, program bureaucrats obtain these outcomes by calling the participants and asking 
them. We cannot do this, and instead use program termination dates from JTPA administrative 
data combined with survey data on job spells to construct the performance measures. Because 
program administrators do not necessarily contact participants on the exact date of termination or 
follow-up, and to allow for some measurement error in the timing of the self-reported job spells, 
we use a 61-day window around each date in constructing the performance measures. We 
measure employment based on the presence or absence of a job spell within this window. We 
calculate hourly wages and weekly earnings for employed persons only, since the corresponding 
performance standards are defined only over this group. We use the highest hourly wage within Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 32 
the window for persons holding more than one job. Earnings are averaged over the window and 
are summed over jobs for persons holding multiple concurrent jobs.  
We then average the constructed performance measures over each subgroup, and regress 
the estimated subgroup impacts on the subgroup averages of the performance measures, using 
the inverse of the Eicker-White standard errors from the impact estimation as weights in the 
regression. We estimate separate regressions for each outcome (earnings and employment over 
18 and 30 months) and for each performance measure.  
 
B. Evidence from JTPA 
Table 2 presents estimates of the relationship between experimental earnings and 
employment impact estimates and various short-term outcomes measured at selected dates after 
random assignment.  The four columns of estimates in Table 2 correspond to cumulated earnings 
and employment gains over the eighteen and thirty month intervals following random 
assignment. Each cell in the table presents the regression coefficient associated with the column's 
dependent variable and the row's independent variable, the estimated (robust) standard error of 
the coefficient, the p-value from a test of the null hypothesis that the population coefficient is 
zero and the R
2 for the regression. The constant from the regression is omitted to reduce clutter. 
For example, the first row of the first column reveals that a regression of earnings over the 18 
months after random assignment on the hourly wage at termination from the JTPA program 
yields an estimated coefficient of $465.41 on the hourly wage, with a standard error of $394.76, 
a p-value of 0.2452 and an overall R
2 of 0.0328.  
Four striking findings emerge from Table 2. First, and most important, we find many 
negative relationships between short run performance indicators and the experimental impact Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 33 
estimates. That is, in many cases, the short-term outcome measures utilized in the JTPA 
performance standards system are perversely related to the longer-term participant earnings and 
employment gains that constitute the program's goals. The only evidence supporting the efficacy 
of short-term outcome measures is the link between employment at follow-up and earnings, 
which is positive at 18 months and positive and marginally statistically significant at 30 months 
for adult men (but statistically insignificant in both cases for adult women, with a negative 
coefficient estimate at 30 months).  Second, the R
2 values are quite low. The short-term 
performance standards measures are only weakly related to the long-term earnings and 
employment gains produced by the program. Third, moving from wage measures at termination 
to “longer-term” measures constructed from follow-up interviews at three months after 
termination usually weakens the relationship between the performance standard measure and the 
longer-run earnings or employment impacts. The R
2 values nearly always decline and the 
estimated coefficients sometimes become less positive or more negative. Fourth, the 
performance measures often do worse at predicting earnings impacts estimated over 30 months 
than at predicting earnings gains estimated over only the first 18 months after random 
assignment. This suggests that our findings are not due to the fact that the in-program period, 
when some participants reduce their labor supply to focus on training, may dominate the 18-
month outcomes of some participants.  
 
C. Evidence from the Literature 
The findings presented in the preceding subsection do not represent an anomaly in the 
literature, but rather characterize the findings of almost all of the small number of existing papers 
that perform similar analyses.  Table 3 summarizes five other studies we found in the literature Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 34 
that examine the relationship between performance standards measures based on short run 
outcome levels and long run program impacts.
27 For each study, the first column of the table 
gives the citation, while the second indicates the particular employment and training program 
considered.  The third column indicates the data used.  The fourth and fifth columns indicate the 
impact measure used (for example, earnings from 18 to 36 months after leaving the program) and 
what impact estimator (for example random assignment) was used to generate the impact 
estimates, respectively.  The sixth column details the particular performance measures 
considered (for example, employment at termination from the program).  The final column 
summarizes the findings.  
The studies range from strongly negative in their findings, as in Gay and Borus (1980), 
Cragg (1997), and Burghardt and Schochet (2001), to more mixed findings such as those 
reported in Friedlander (1988) and Zornitsky, et al. (1988).  The most positive of the studies, 
Zornitsky, et al. (1988), examines a single treatment program treating relatively homogeneous 
clients, a context very different from, and perhaps not generalizable to, multi-treatment programs 
serving heterogeneous populations such as JTPA and WIA. This narrowly focused program 
focused on the skills for a particular occupation, and so did not stimulate post-program human 
capital investment, which, as we have already noted, would weaken the relationship between the 
short run performance measures and long run impacts.  Taken together, these studies generally 
support our finding from the JTPA data that performance standards based on short-term outcome 
levels likely do little to encourage the provision of services to those who benefit most from them 
in employment and training programs.  
 
VIII. Conclusions Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 35 
Performance standards systems that attempt to motivate bureaucratic behavior by 
rewarding government agencies on the basis of short-run outcome measures are widely perceived 
to be a solution to the problem of inefficiency in government, despite the absence of any strong 
evidence that such standards lead bureaucrats to increase their attainment of long-run program 
goals. We present a model of training center behavior in the presence of performance standards, 
and show why these standards focus on short-term outcomes.  Within the context of this model, 
we precisely define cream skimming and show how such systems provide an incentive for it.    
Our empirical analysis reaches two important conclusions. First, whatever cream 
skimming occurs in JTPA produces only modest efficiency gains or losses.  Opposition to cream 
skimming must come on equity grounds. Put differently, our results show that the efficiency cost 
of not cream skimming, and instead focusing on the hard to serve among the eligible population, 
is a modest one.  
Our second important conclusion is that the JTPA performance standards do not promote 
efficiency because the short-term outcomes they rely on have essentially a zero correlation with 
long-term impacts on employment and earnings.  This surprising result comports with the 
findings in several other studies that have estimated this relationship.   
Nothing in this paper says that a successful performance standards system cannot be 
devised.  The available evidence suggests that bureaucrats respond to performance standards, 
although sometimes perversely so.  The available evidence also suggests that the efficiency gains 
or losses from cream skimming are likely to be small.  However, the performance systems that 
have been tried in the past have generally used short run target measures that are only weakly 
related to long run efficiency measures.  If performance standards are to be put in place that Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 36 
motivate efficiency, long term studies should be conducted to determine which short run 
measures are strongly related to long term efficiency criteria.Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 37 
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1 See Hanushek (2002) for a discussion of accountability systems in education based on 
performance standards at the teacher and school level. See Barnow (1992) for a discussion of 
performance standards in publicly provided training programs 
2 Wilson (1989) and Dixit (2002) discuss conflicts in the objectives of programs as outcomes of a 
political process. 
3 See Becker (1964), Mincer (1972), Heckman, Hohmann, Smith, and Khoo (2000) and Hotz, 
Imbens, and Klerman (2000). 
4 We abstract from decisions regarding the timing of training.  See Hansen, Heckman and Vytlacil 
(2000). 
5
 It can also be negative in the long run, as indeed it was for male youth in JTPA.  See, for 
example, Bloom et al. (1993).  
6 Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) present evidence on the importance of general equilibrium 
effects in evaluating large scale educational programs. Such effects are much less likely to be 
important for smaller scale job training programs. 
7 Note that r may be a social discount factor. 
8 We assume interior solutions.  Sufficient conditions for an interior solution are concavity of (2) in 
e for all 
0
, ai Y , convexity of ci(ei) for each i, and Inada conditions on both cost and technology.  For 
some S, the constraint (4) may be slack (that is, λ  = 1 can be obtained). 
9 There may be more than one S that qualifies.  If so, we assume the training center picks the 
particular set chosen at random. Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 46 
                                                                                                                                                                 
10 Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2001) demonstrate that most of the variation in future earnings 
gains is unforecastable, even for college graduates. Bell and Orr (2002) show that caseworkers do a 
poor job of predicting  a ∆  in a program that provided job training to welfare recipients. 
11 There is an additional stage to the allocation process that we do not consider, namely, the 
allocation of the overall budget among centers.  The budget should be allocated to equate returns at 
the margin for all centers. 
12 In this heuristic problem, we assume that the second order conditions are satisfied. 
13 In thinking about cream skimming from a policy perspective, two other facts should be kept in 
mind.  First, even if cream skimming occurs, the cream of the JTPA eligible (or applicant) 
population was still disadvantaged.  They must have been so in order to satisfy JTPA’s eligibility 
rules.  Thus, cream skimming did not mean that JTPA resources got spent on, for example, middle 
class people.  Second, JTPA was far from the only employment and training program available at 
the time (just as WIA is far from the only program available now).  As documented in National 
Commission for Employment Policy (1995), dozens of other programs coexisted with JTPA.  
These other programs may well have provided services better suited to the hard to serve among 
JTPA’s eligible population than did JTPA.  Determining whether cream skimming, should it occur, 
is good or bad, requires more thought than the literature typically devotes to it.  
14 In models with regressors, this assumption is 
10
,, , ( ) ( ) for all  , ai ai ai a XYY X i ∆= − = ∆  yielding 
equal impacts for all persons with the same X. 
15 See Devine and Heckman (1996) for a detailed study of JTPA program eligibility and Orr et al. 
(1996) or Kemple, Doolittle, and Wallace (1993) for details on the types of services provided and 
their relative frequency. Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 47 
                                                                                                                                                                 
16 In addition, it includes measures related to skill or credential attainment (as did JTPA), a 
measure of before-after earnings changes, and measures based on “customer” satisfaction surveys. 
17 Doolittle and Traeger (1990), Hotz (1992) and Orr et al. (1996) describe the design of the 
experiment.  Bloom et al. (1997) summarize the experimental impact estimates. 
18 See Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997) for more details on this estimator, including the 
construction of the standard errors. 
19 We omit analyses for male and female youth throughout the paper due to the small sample sizes 
available for these groups. 
20 AFDC is now called Temporary Aid to Needy Families or TANF. 
21 Their earnings measure combines self-report data with data from UI earnings records.  For more 
details, see the discussion in Orr et al. (1996). 
22 Orr et al. (1996) also present subgroup impact estimates for male and female youth (see Exhibits 
5.19 and 5.20).  As expected given the small sample sizes, they find no statistically significant 
differences in estimated impacts among the subgroups. 
23 The analyses in both this section and the preceding section have the potential limitation that they 
condition on persons who reach random assignment.  In choosing whom to serve, program staff 
members care about relationships conditional on application to the program, not on reaching 
random assignment. 
24 However, even at this stage, self-selection cannot be entirely ruled out. 
25 See the discussions in Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1998) and Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 
(1999, Section 5.2) on the origin of this estimator. Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 48 
                                                                                                                                                                 
26 An alternative strategy would generate predicted individual impacts by including interaction 
terms between baseline covariates and the treatment group dummy in an impact regression.    
27 We thank Tim Bartik of the Upjohn Institute for providing us with copies of two of the 
unpublished papers. 
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TABLE 1A 
Experimental Impact Estimates by Subgroup 
Adult  Females       




  18 Months  30 Months  18 Months  30 Months 
Labor Force Status 
P-value for equal impacts  0.3919  0.5745  0.4715  0.2286 
Employed 1223.78  1487.38  0.0017  -0.0158 
  (651.64) (2461.08) (0.0135)  (0.0168) 
Unemployed  507.42 428.84 0.0112 0.0184 
  (507.92) (1715.10) (0.0112)  (0.0128) 
Out of the Labor Force  1543.72  3274.29  0.0274  0.0184 
  (601.48) (2089.21) (0.0160)  (0.0188) 
Education 
P-value for equal impacts  0.6890  0.4641  0.8149  0.4646 
Highest grade completed < 10  1029.22  -2227.56  0.0135  0.0175 
  (643.40) (2577.38) (0.0164)  (0.0182) 
Highest grade completed 10-11  1341.37  3088.46  0.0289  0.0246 
  (592.06) (2179.51) (0.0147)  (0.0171) 
Highest grade completed 12  460.29  1503.23  0.0129  -0.0053 
  (469.73) (1711.16) (0.0109)  (0.0129) 
Highest grade completed > 12  971.20  795.14  0.0115  0.0209 
  (816.54) (2997.34) (0.0172)  (0.0211) 
AFDC Receipt 
P-value for equal impacts  0.7224  0.0371  0.0277  0.2607 
Not Receiving AFDC  712.26  -947.01  0.0028  0.0026 
  (392.05) (1462.17) (0.0087)  (0.0105) 
Receiving  AFDC  924.57 3624.35 0.0343  0.0211 
  (451.07) (1631.02) (0.0113)  (0.0127) 
Recent Employment 
P-value for equal impacts  0.8614  0.0492  0.5708  0.0139 
Currently employed  1104.08  396.24  0.0138  0.0056 
  (721.42) (2851.27) (0.0151)  (0.0197) 
Last employed 0-2 months ago  594.01  979.22  0.0099  0.0060 
  (713.69) (2485.38) (0.0161)  (0.0181) 
Last employed 3-5 months ago  171.44  -7677.17  -0.0063  -0.0589 
  (953.91) (3485.31) (0.0199)  (0.0220) 
Last employed 6-8 months ago  1874.38  975.22  0.0451  0.0502 
 (1175.53)  (3721.12)  (0.0263)  (0.0305) 
Last employed 9-11 months ago  1679.73  5244.59  0.0310  0.0636 
 (1311.91)  (4437.63)  (0.0305)  (0.0382) 
Last employed ≥  12 months ago  1304.36 4919.73  0.0341  0.0347 
  (587.15) (2020.46) (0.0155)  (0.0180) 
Never employed  610.59  -2490.44  0.0335  -0.0059 
  (609.42) (2736.46) (0.0168)  (0.0191) Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith, 50  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using National JTPA Study data. 
Notes:  Monthly earnings are based on self-reports with top 1% trimming.  Estimates are 
adjusted for program dropouts in the treatment group.  Earnings impacts are calculated 
using all sample members with valid observations for self-reported monthly earnings 
during each period.  The sample includes 4886 valid observations for the 18-month 
period after random assignment and 1147 valid observations for the 30-month period 
after random assignment.  Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. 
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TABLE 1B 
Experimental Impact Estimates by Subgroup 
Adult Males         
Subgroup Earnings  Impacts   
Measured over 
Employment Impacts Measured over 
  18 Months  30 Months  18 Months  30 Months 
Labor Force Status 
P-value for equal impacts  0.0407  0.3469  0.2679  0.6517 
Employed 2839.24  6328.20  0.0300  0.0005 
 (1145.51)  (4143.22)  (0.0166)  (0.0194) 
Unemployed 718.84  3021.68  0.0056  0.0180 
 (710.16)  (2339.51)  (0.0105)  (0.0125) 
Out of the Labor Force  -2193.85  -2725.72  -0.0163  0.0289 
 (1658.81)  (4693.28)  (0.0262)  (0.0281) 
Education 
P-value for equal impacts  0.6077  0.7939  0.9587  0.7206 
Highest grade completed < 10  680.26  1713.46  0.0114  0.0403 
 (1193.62)  (3935.62)  (0.0203)  (0.0225) 
Highest grade completed 10-11  -64.77  -270.18  0.0120  0.0134 
 (1020.79)  (3516.67)  (0.0163)  (0.0188) 
Highest grade completed 12  1438.13  552.70  0.0030  0.0105 
 (793.68)  (2729.26)  (0.0119)  (0.0141) 
Highest grade completed > 12  -92.00  4886.81  0.0116  0.0201 
 (1238.21)  (4155.34)  (0.0172)  (0.0221) 
AFDC Receipt 
P-value for equal impacts  0.5948  0.5794  0.3813  0.6678 
Not Receiving AFDC  722.73  2933.22  0.0122  0.0161 
 (556.43)  (1810.58)  (0.0085)  (0.0099) 
Receiving AFDC  -232.18  -274.82  -0.0132  0.0306 
 (1706.56)  (5495.50)  (0.0278)  (0.0322) 
Recent Employment 
P-value for equal impacts  0.5995  0.6193  0.9112  0.7010 
Currently employed  2668.20  3053.96  0.0176  -0.0134 
 (1230.61)  (4174.11)  (0.0178)  (0.0212) 
Last employed 0-2 months ago  816.36  6126.54  0.0168  0.0205 
 (1091.14)  (3637.23)  (0.0152)  (0.0180) 
Last employed 3-5 months ago  -425.61  1248.64  0.0037  0.0119 
 (1162.99)  (3794.83)  (0.0176)  (0.0209) 
Last employed 6-8 months ago  -5.65  -790.27  -0.0135  0.0312 
 (1824.51)  (5453.91)  (0.0256)  (0.0296) 
Last employed 9-11 months ago  1191.58  -4914.81  0.0163  0.0098 
 (2328.58)  (7657.02)  (0.0384)  (0.0478) 
Last employed ≥  12 months ago  525.44 3885.63  0.0284  0.0475 
 (1333.79)  (4722.38)  (0.0224)  (0.0257) 
Never employed  -799.52  -6377.68  0.0017  0.0145 
 (1606.04)  (6242.27)  (0.0295)  (0.0319) Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith, 52  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using National JTPA Study data. 
Notes:  Monthly earnings are based on self-reports with top 1% trimming.  Estimates are adjusted for program 
dropouts in the treatment group.  Earnings impacts are calculated using all sample members with valid 
observations for self-reported monthly earnings during each period.  The sample includes 4886 valid 
observations for the 18-month period after random assignment and 1147 valid observations for the 30-month 
period after random assignment.  Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith, 53  
Table 2 
Relationship Between ∆  and 
1
1 Y  in JTPA: Earnings and Employment Impacts 
 




18 Months After 
Random 
Assignment 
30 Months After 
Random 
Assignment 
18 Months After  
Random 
Assignment 








p = 0.0645 
R
2 = 0.0809 
-1729.66 
(1280.64) 
p = 0.1842 
R
2 = 0.0426 
-0.018 
(0.008) 
p = 0.0202 
R
2 = 0.1246 
-0.010 
(0.011) 
p = 0.3559 
R
2 = 0.0208 




p = 0.6726 
R
2 = 0.0044 
-12.05 
(36.54) 
p = 0.7432 
R
2 = 0.0026 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
p = 0.2728 
R
2 = 0.0293 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
p = 0.3277 
R
2 = 0.0234 




p = 0.9012 
R
2 = 0.0004 
-2065.61 
(3928.63) 
p = 0.6019 
R
2 = 0.0069 
-0.023 
(0.023) 
p = 0.3213 
R
2 = 0.0246 
-0.029 
(0.033) 
p = 0.3767 
R
2 = 0.0196 




p = 0.3132 
R
2 = 0.0248 
-1873.03 
(6236.83) 
p = 0.7655 
R
2 = 0.0022 
-0.067 
(0.037) 
p = 0.0767 
R
2 = 0.0745 
-0.024 
(0.053) 
p = 0.6521 
R
2 = 0.0050 
Adult Males 




p = 0.2452 
R
2 = 0.0328 
-1405.68 
(1653.30) 
p = 0.4001 
R
2 = 0.0173 
0.003 
(0.005) 
p = 0.4914 
R
2 = 0.0116 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
p = 0.6230 
R
2 = 0.0059 




p = 0.3690 
R
2 = 0.0197 
-20.76 
(31.79) 
p = 0.5174 
R
2 = 0.0103 
0.000 
(0.000) 
p = 0.9921 
R
2 = 0.0000 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
p = 0.3274 
R
2 = 0.0234 




p = 0.0737 
R
2 = 0.0778 
3673.71 
(5869.08) 
p = 0.5349 
R
2 = 0.0097 
0.005 
(0.017) 
p = 0.7559 
R
2 = 0.0024 
-0.059 
(0.034) 
p = 0.0850 
R
2 = 0.0723 




p = 0.3058 
R
2 = 0.0256 
18716.00 
(9842.28) 
p = 0.0643 
R
2 = 0.0810 
0.050 
(0.028) 
p = 0.0848 
R
2 = 0.0707 
0.021 
(0.061) 
p = 0.7338 
R
2 = 0.0029 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using National JTPA Study data. 
Notes:  The actual JTPA performance measures are defined as follows: “Hourly Wage at Placement” is the 
average wage at program termination for employed adults. “Weekly Earnings at Follow-up” are the average 
weekly wage of adults employed 13 weeks after program termination.  “Employment Rate at Placement” is the 
fraction of adults employed at program termination. “Employment Rate at Follow-up” is the fraction of adults 
who were employed 13 weeks after program termination.  In our analysis, employment rates were calculated 
based on the presence or absence of a job spell within 30 days of each reference date (termination or follow-up).  
Hourly wages were calculated based on the highest reported hourly wage for all job spells reported within 30 
days of each reference date.  Weekly earnings were calculated by averaging the product of hourly wages and 
hours worked per week across all reported job spells within 30 days of each reference date weighted by the 
fraction of the 30-day window spanned by each job spell. Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith, 55 
Table 3 
Evidence on the Correlation Between Y1 and ∆   from Several Studies 
Study   Program    Data    Measure of impact    Impact estimator   Performance measures    Findings 
Gay and Borus (1980)  Manpower 
Development and 
Training Act (MDTA), 
Job Opportunities in 
the Business Sector 








from December 1968 
to June 1970 and 
matched (on age, race, 
city and sometimes 
neighborhood) 
comparison sample of 
eligible non-
participants. 
Impact on social 
security earnings in 
1973 (from 18 to 36 
months after program 
exit)  
Non-experimental 
"kitchen sink" Tobit 
model  
Employment in quarter 
after program, before-
after (four quarters 
before to one quarter 
after) changes in 
weeks worked, weeks 
not in the labor force, 




insurance received and 
amount of public 
assistance received.  
No measure has a 
consistent, positive and 
statistically significant 
relationship to the 
estimated impacts 
across subgroups and 
programs.  The before-
after measures, 
particularly weeks 
worked and wages, do 
much better than 
employment in the 
quarter after the 
program. 
Zornitsky, et al. (1988)   AFDC Homemaker-
Home Health Aid 
Demonstration  
Volunteers in the 
seven states in which 
the demonstration 
projects were 
conducted.  To be 
eligible, volunteers had 
to have been on AFDC 
continuously for at 
least 90 days.  
Mean monthly 
earnings in the 32 
months after random 
assignment and mean 
monthly combined 
AFDC and food stamp 
benefits in the 29 





wages at termination.  
Employment and 
welfare receipt three 
and six months after 
termination.  Mean 
weekly earnings and 
welfare benefits in the 
three and six month 
periods after 
termination.  These 
measures are examined 
both adjusted and not 
adjusted for observable 
factors including 
trainee demographics 
and welfare and 
employment histories 
and local labor 
markets.  
All measures have the 
correct sign on their 
correlation with 
earnings impacts, 
whether adjusted or 
not.  The employment 
and earnings measures 
are all statistically 
significant (or close to 
it).  The welfare 
measures are correctly 
correlated with welfare 
impacts but the 
employment measures 
are not unless adjusted.  
The measures at three 
and six months do 
better than those at 
termination, but there 
is little gain from 
going from three to 
six. Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith, 56 
 
Table 3 (Continued) 
Evidence on the Correlation Between Y1 and ∆   from Several Studies 
Study    Program    Data    Measure of impact    Impact estimator   Performance measures    Findings 
Friedlander (1988)   Mandatory welfare-to-
work programs in San 
Diego, Baltimore, 
Virginia, Arkansas, 
and Cook County.  
Applicants and 
recipients of AFDC 
(varies across 
programs).  Data 
collected as part of 
MDRC's experimental 




(from UI earnings 






quarterly earnings) in 
quarters 2 and 3 (short-
term) or quarters 4 to 6 
(long term) after 
random assignment.  
Welfare receipt in 
quarter 3 (short-term) 
or quarter 6 (long-
term) after random  
assignment. 
Employment measure 
is positively correlated 
with earnings gains but 
not welfare savings for 
most programs.  
Welfare indicator is 
always positively 
correlated with 
earnings impacts, but 
rarely significantly so.  
It is not related to 
welfare savings.  
Long-term 
performance measures 
do little better (and 
sometimes worse) than 
short-term measures. 
Cragg (1997)  JTPA (1983-87)    NLSY   Before-after change in 
participant earnings 
Generalized bivariate 




Fraction of time spent 
working since leaving 
school in the pre-
program period.  This 







after earnings changes. 
Burghardt and 
Schochet (2001)  
Job Corps  Experimental data 
from the National Job 
Corps Study 
The outcome measures 
include receipt of 
education or training, 
weeks of education or 
training, hours per 
week of education or 
training, receipt of a 
high school diploma or 
GED, receipt of a 
vocational certificate, 
earnings and being 
arrested.  All are 





Job Corps centers 




performers based on 
their overall 
performance rankings 
in Program Years 
1994, 1995 and 1996.  
High and low centers 
were in the top and 
bottom third nationally 
in all three years, 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Heckman, Smith, and Heinrich, 56 
 
  Eligibility for JTPA 
 
    
 
  Awareness of JTPA 
 
    
 
  Application to JTPA 
 
    
 
  Acceptance into JTPA 
 
    
 





THE JTPA SELECTION PROCESS 